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TThe hearts and minds of the citizens of impoverished countries, we’ve been told time and again, can’t be won without filling their bellies. Yet nine years after the U.S. in-vasion of Iraq – and tens of billions in reconstruction aid later – Iraq’s GDP barely exceeds the prewar high. Worse, the economy remains almost wholly dependent on oil, which generates 90 percent of tax revenues and more than 80 percent of export revenues. Now, NATO is rapidly winding down its presence in Af-
ghanistan. And the Afghan economy, which is almost to-
tally dependent on foreign aid and crumbs from the U.S. 
military’s table (along with opium), is likely to go into a 
tailspin as donor countries recoil from Afghanistan’s in-
competent governance and failure to contain pervasive 
corruption. What is the point of spending trillions of dol-
lars and hundreds of thousands of lives (American and Af-
ghan) to secure a hostile country if the economic mess we 
leave is as bad as the one we inherited? 
What, indeed. Hence, the emergence of a new field in 
economics, dubbed “expeditionary economics” by Carl 
Schramm, the former head of the Kauffman Foundation. 
That concept focuses on the development side of the mili-
tary equation. The gist is straightforward: economic growth
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is vital for stabilizing post-conflict and post-
disaster settings, and the U.S. military, often 
the dominant player in such environments, 
must sharpen its ability to encourage indige-
nous entrepreneurship. It is Schramm’s con-
tention (and mine) that the conventional U.S. 
approach in recent post-conflict recoveries 
has failed largely because it has failed to focus 
on precisely this objective.
The expeditionary economics approach is 
based on a pair of propositions. First, even in 
highly unstable settings, entrepreneurial ac-
tivity can flourish and provide employment, 
essential goods and financial stability for the 
local populations. Second, successful local en-
trepreneurs, particularly those involved in 
new firms, have a vested interest in improved 
governance – the rule of law and control of 
corruption. So, once they become established, 
entrepreneurs will lead efforts to achieve those 
goals. With these processes in play, Schramm 
argues that sustained economic growth, and 
thus stability, can be attained in what were 
previously considered impossible situations. 
And at least one case study, of the impact of the 
coffee industry in post-genocidal Rwanda, 
suggests he’s right. 
iraq, the morning after
Most of the core propositions of expeditionary 
economics can be traced to the U.S. experience 
in Iraq. Since the 2003 invasion, Iraq’s econ-
omy has floundered badly. Despite vast 
amounts of assistance along with increasing 
oil revenues, the country has been plagued by 
chronic unemployment – the government 
claimed joblessness had fallen to “only” 16 per-
cent in 2012. Underemployment is harder to 
measure, but is almost certainly much higher. 
Pretty much all job creation in the formal 
economy has been make-work in the public 
sector. A shadow economy continues to em-
ploy a large segment – perhaps 40 to 45 per-
cent – of the labor force. As in other countries, 
though, it operates at low productivity be-
cause it has little access to capital and cannot 
enforce contracts through legal means. 
In the initial stages, the U.S. strategy for re-
pairing the Iraqi economy after the fall of Sad-
dam Hussein seemed promising. It was drawn 
up along lines similar to the shock-therapy 
transition programs successfully imple-
mented in Chile under the Pinochet regime in 
the 1980s and in Poland after the overthrow of 
Communism. In devising their strategy, Amer-
ican planners drew heavily on the conven-
tional wisdom in vogue in the early 1990s – 
neoliberalism as embedded in the standard 
Washington Consensus formula (macroeco-
nomic stability, fiscal prudence and free mar-
kets) – so often prescribed in times of crisis by 
the International Monetary Fund. 
The cornerstone of the strategy was to cre-
ate an independent central bank charged with 
maintaining price stability that would be able 
to resist pressures to finance big government 
budget deficits. The primary goal (after stabili-
zation) was to unleash the competitive forces 
suppressed by Saddam, thereby increasing 
productivity. As in post-Soviet settings, though, 
a secondary objective was to make the transi-
tion irreversible – here, by destroying state-
dominated Ba’athist institutions and replacing 
them with decentralized, market-oriented 
ones. 
The Americans were convinced that a Chile-
like, competitive, noninflationary economy 
would serve as the ideal environment for job 
creation through private-sector innovation 
and investment. Accordingly, almost all barri-
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ers to international trade were eliminated. (A 
5 percent across-the-board tariff was allowed, 
though largely as a revenue raiser.) And foreign 
investment was welcomed, both as a means to 
supplement anemic Iraqi savings and to obtain 
modern industrial technology. The only levy, 
apart from the import tariff, was a Steve 
Forbes-type 15 percent flat tax on consump-
tion. An $18 billion infrastructure program 
was focused on lowering private sector pro-
duction costs. Job One for the Iraqi govern-
ment was to keep out of the way.
But the strategy was designed without 
consulting Iraqis who knew anything about 
the economic culture. And, of course, Iraqi 
bureaucrats with practical experience in gov-
ernance – most of whom had lost their jobs 
because they’d been members of the Ba’athist 
Party – played no role in the early implemen-
tation of the program. 
The limitations of this strategy quickly be-
came apparent. It offered nothing to the large 
numbers of Iraqis lacking either marketable 
skills – a dismayingly large group, since public 
education fell into decay under Saddam – or 
capital for small businesses. The legacy pri-
vate-banking system, which was stuck holding 
Saddam’s bad debts, was on the verge of col-
lapse. And besides, the banks had little experi-
ence in commercial lending. As a result, most 
Iraqis were left out in the cold, fueling wide-
spread anger that was easily mobilized by ex-
tremist sectarian groups.
In this violent, politically uncertain envi-
ronment, it proved impossible to attract the 
private investment (domestic or foreign) on 
which the whole strategy depended. The result 
was a vicious circle of private sector underper-
formance and high unemployment – and little 
hope of change, thanks to widespread, eco-
nomically disruptive violence. 
Note that the strategy was premised on the 
notion that initial private sector successes 
would empower the winners to push for fur-
ther economic reforms and improved gover-
nance, so that the growth process would take 
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on a momentum of its own. But there was no 
Plan B. What’s more, the vacuum created by 
the government’s pullback from day-to-day 
economic activity was filled by organized re-
ligious and criminal groups whose interests 
hardly coincided with the commonweal. 
Even after the violence in Iraq was largely 
suppressed, organized crime abetted by per-
vasive government corruption (Iraq ranks 
near the bottom at 175th on Transparency In-
ternational’s 183-country Corruption Percep-
tion Index, just behind Haiti) stifled entrepre-
neurial activity and undermined public trust 
in government institutions. Such trust in, 
among other things, the enforceability of con-
tracts and property rights, is critical to effi-
ciency in market systems. Thus today, entre-
preneurship succeeds only at the sectarian 
level, where high levels of trust remain.
Advocates of expeditionary economics 
have noted the folly of top-down economic 
planning in countries with little means of im-
plementing it. The Iraq strategy focused on 
long-term goals with little regard for the task 
of getting from here to there – in particular, 
the challenge of giving large numbers of peo-
ple a stake in its success, early in the process. 
Government ministries, excluded from 
planning, were ill-prepared to assume author-
ity after the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Many 
projects are simply rusting away because the 
Iraqi bureaucracy has refused to accept respon-
sibility for ongoing management and mainte-
nance costs. The resulting waste of aid and re-
construction resources has been staggering. 
A major lesson here is the wisdom of mini-
mizing conflict with the existing culture. With 
little social capital to lean on, entrepreneurial 
activity in Iraq has the greatest chance of 
thriving at the local level. If a bottom-up strat-
egy stressing community-based development 
had been adopted and nurtured by the occu-
pying forces, it might have been sustainable, 
and Iraq’s prospects would not have been so 
grim in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal. 
can afghanistan be saved?
Back to the conflict in the forefront of current 
discussions of expeditionary economics. Over 
the last decade, the influx of military con-
tracting and development projects has fueled 
rapid expansion in the Afghan economy. Al-
though still near the bottom on almost all de-
velopment indicators, GDP (measured in 
terms of purchasing power) roughly tripled 
between 2003 and 2011.
This growth, however, does not herald the 
rise of a viable Afghan economy. The capacity 
(and maybe the inclination) of the govern-
ment to deliver basic services remains severely 
limited, and government presence in remote 
areas is sketchy at best. Illegal activity contin-
ues to thrive, further undermining the central 
government’s tenuous authority and influence. 
Opium-poppy production remains by far the 
most dynamic economic activity, generating 
vast profits that are too often used to finance 
the Taliban insurgency.
Indeed, 10 years after the overthrow of the 
Taliban government, the World Bank esti-
mates that the international military presence 
and donor contributions account for more 
than 97 percent – that’s right, 97 percent – of 
Afghanistan’s legal GDP. Despite attempts to 
promote manufacturing and other industry, 
subsistence farming remains the mainstay of 
the indigenous economy. Adding to Afghani-
stan’s woes, the flood of international aid and 
military contracts has fueled inflation and 
created a real estate bubble. Housing prices in 
suburban Kabul rivaled those of European 
capitals before air started leaking from the 
bubble last fall.
The coalition’s withdrawal in 2014 will 
likely trigger a rapid decrease in foreigners’ 
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spending, and a commensurate collapse in real 
estate. Wealthy Afghans are already buying up 
property in Dubai at a record pace. Even the 
World Bank, which tends to err on the side of 
understatement, concedes that economic 
growth could turn sharply negative. That 
would destroy a lot of jobs created in the last 
decade, most significantly for young 
men employed by private security com-
panies. They might well turn to the Tali-
ban, organized crime or regional mili-
tias for income. 
Researchers at Tufts University have 
concluded that much of the blame for 
this precarious situation lies in the way 
that Western foreign aid has been man-
aged. Rather than generating good will, 
development projects are viewed nega-
tively by most Afghans. At the very least, 
the widespread sense that aid resources 
are being misused further tarnishes the 
image of the Afghan government; at 
worst, it shifts the blame for the utter 
failure of the Afghan state from Kabul to 
Western aid agencies.
Aid failure in Afghanistan can be 
traced to the faulty premise that im-
proved socioeconomic conditions 
would stabilize and pacify the country. 
In truth, rapid growth has been desta-
bilizing since it raised the stakes in the 
competition for power and resources 
among the country’s regional militias 
and ethnic factions. Lack of coordination on 
the part of the major donors, combined with 
the narrow focus of most assistance programs, 
has further hindered attempts to build the in-
stitutions of governance that are prerequisites 
to sustainable growth. 
But what looks hopeless through a con-
ventional lens seems very different from the 
perspective of Carl Schramm and company. 
They are convinced that entrepreneurial ac-
tivity is compatible with ongoing conflict – 
albeit in somewhat distorted fashion. And 
field work in Afghanistan sponsored by the 
Kauffman Foundation suggests that, despite 
government and donor neglect of Afghani-
stan’s private sector, it has tremendous poten-
tial for generating employment. 
Long-held stereotypes about entrepre-
neurs in conflict settings were found to be 
dead wrong. Indeed, based on some 130 in-
terviews, Jake Cusack and Erik Malmstrom 
(U.S. military combat veterans in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan who went on earn graduate de-
grees at Harvard) concluded that Afghan 
businesses respond rationally to incentives – 
and that uncertainty, not physical insecurity, 
is the fundamental obstacle to growth. 
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The Afghan government is part of the 
problem, not the solution. It fails to provide 
basic services, yet demands fealty and bribes 
that raise the cost of doing business – in par-
ticular, the cost of starting a business with lit-
tle capital. And both military contracting and 
foreign aid exacerbate the problem by giving 
the government more leverage over access to 
jobs, capital and markets. Businesses survive 
by focusing on trading rather than long-term 
market relationships and by purchasing pro-
tection from the relevant warlords. But the 
drag on productivity is daunting.
The one bright spot in the effort to stimu-
late indigenous enterprise has been the coun-
try’s recent bottom-up attempt at improving 
governance and raising small-business pro-
ductivity, using aid cash as an incentive. The 
National Solidarity Program created commu-
nity development councils in most villages. 
This allowed community groups to take the 
lead in planning local infrastructure invest-
ments – schools, water pumps, irrigation sys-
tems – that are 90 percent funded by aid. (A 
10 percent match is required, so locals have 
some skin in the game.) All told, roughly $1 
billion has been spent in 29,000 villages. 
But the National Solidarity Program has 
been the exception to the rule in a country 
that has pocketed at least $50 billion in eco-
nomic aid since the Americans arrived, along 
with countless billions in the form of services 
purchased by NATO. Corruption is every-
where, undermining critical institutions like 
those needed to enforce contracts and raising 
the cost of doing business. It’s no wonder, 
then, that Afghanistan ranks a dismal 160th 
on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
Index (down six places in 2012, and behind 
such exemplars of free enterprise as Equato-
rial Guinea, Burkina Faso and Ukraine). Sim-
ply registering a change in ownership of prop-
erty takes an average of 250 days. 
It’s very late in the game to apply an expedi-
tionary-economics-based strategy to Afghani-
stan. But the United States is committed to 
providing more aid; at the very least, a consis-
tent policy of bottom-up assistance to entre-
preneurs would offer hope to some Afghans as 
well as provide a donor-learning experience 
that would be applicable to the next conflict.
the next time
Though one can hope that the United States 
and its allies will avoid conflicts on the scale 
and duration of Iraq or Afghanistan, many 
themes common to those conflicts are likely 
to re-emerge down the road. Countries will 
be confronted by the challenge of groups of 
militants or criminals (or both) that find 
sanctuary inside failed states. In the absence 
of strong governments to expel them, these 
groups often mobilize popular support and 
extend their control by assuming some of the 
functions of government, including the deliv-
ery of services and suppression of violence.
As a result of their experiences in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Western armed forces have come 
to the realization that this setting does not 
lend itself to a purely military solution. While 
ground can be captured, it cannot be secured 
and stabilized without the support of the 
local population. Thus, to be successful, oper-
ations must include reconstruction as a key 
component.
The Afghan government fails 
to provide basic services,  
yet demands bribes that raise 
the cost of starting a busi-
ness with little capital.
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Specifically, the U.S. military was able to 
assist in both countries through the Com-
mander’s Emergency Response Program, in 
which officers designed and implemented 
local projects like building schools, roads and 
other essential infrastructure. To jump-start 
local economies, these programs could be 
easily extended to support local entrepre-
neurs, providing them with seed money and 
security. 
Both the Iraqi and Afghan cases demon-
strate the vitality of entrepreneurship in situ-
ations previously thought to be infertile 
ground for business start-ups. And they sup-
port the conviction that comprehensive eco-
nomic governance reforms aren’t a prerequi-
site for self-sustaining economic growth. 
One major policy failure in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan was the lack of an effective exit 
strategy. In both cases, the withdrawal of 
forces left vacuums in which no significant 
groups had vested interests in carrying re-
forms through to completion. To the contrary, 
those who have inherited power have incen-
tives to derail the reforms. 
The analysis of Mancur Olson, a promi-
nent American scholar in the development of 
what is called public-choice economics, helps 
in assaying the role of entrepreneurs in this 
context. Olson distinguished between “distri-
butional” coalitions, whose actions tend to 
undermine economic growth by protecting 
their own privileges, and “encompassing” 
ones, whose interests align with broader soci-
etal goals. Clearly, local communities must 
provide sufficient checks to prevent the emer-
gence of distributional coalitions. 
Looking ahead, there are likely to be situa-
tions in which countries – think of Pakistan – 
attempting to stem violence or quell insur-
gencies, or both, are nonetheless unwilling to 
accept the presence of foreign military force. 
Here, expeditionary economics could play a 
significant role, particularly in areas that are 
currently out of the effective reach of the cen-
tral government. 
Pakistan has a professional military that 
(with additional training) could assist in the 
establishment of new entrepreneurs. More-
over, the government’s New Growth Frame-
work, a sophisticated economic plan (aspired 
to, if not always followed) is entirely consistent 
with this sort of grass-roots encouragement of 
enterprise. 
Since the Pakistani military is stretched 
thin and cannot provide adequate security in 
every arena of conflict, fresh thinking would 
be needed to implement an expeditionary 
economic approach. One possibility: the cre-
ation of secured reconstruction zones along 
the lines that were successful in Afghanistan 
and in Haiti (in the aftermath of the devastat-
ing earthquake in 2010). 
In extreme situations, a more radical ap-
proach, like the establishment of self-support-
ing, self-governing zones similar to those 
under consideration in Honduras might be 
needed. (Honduras plans to create “charter 
cities” – what amount to greenfield cities – 
that provide security, infrastructure and fi-
nancing for new businesses.)
* * *
Entrepreneurial economics as an alterna-
tive to traditional aid-based strategies is gain-
ing currency. Recent research by Raymond 
Gilpin of the U.S. Institute of Peace and Gayle 
Lemmon of the Council on Foreign Relations 
has documented the viability of job-creating 
entrepreneurship in fragile settings. More-
over, “fragile” applies to circumstances short 
of war, like post-earthquake Haiti or even 
post-tsunami Japan, where the government 
has created special tax and regulation zones 
designed to attract entrepreneurs. The les-
sons here are well worth another look. m
